Due Process in Selective Service Appeals
The appeal board is the final authority within the Selective Service System.1 Like the local board, it is required to examine all the evidence
presented by the registrant and to place him in the lowest of the nineteen classifications presently prescribed by regulation. 2 Only those classified 1-A (available for military service), I-A-O (conscientious objector
available for noncombatant service), or 1-0 (conscientious objector
available for civilian service) may be drafted.
The Selective Service registrant reaches the appeal board upon his
official protest of unfavorable classification by the local board.3 The
critical importance of fairness at that level is mandated by the procedural context in which the appeal takes place. First, the appeal board
is required by regulations to undertake a de novo review-an entirely
new consideration of the registrant's classification. 4 Therefore, the
validity of the appeal board's decision, and not the actions of the local
board, will be the subject of any judicial review that follows.5 Second,
I See Selective Service Regulations, 82 C.F.R. § 1600 et seq. (1971). These regulations are
undergoing rapid revision, the latest and most drastic in response to the Military Selective
Service Act of 1971, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 92-129 [hereinafter cited as 1971
Act]. Regulations issued pursuant to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 451 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Act], will hereinafter be cited as Old
Reg. § -. Regulations issued pursuant to the 1971 Act will be cited as New Reg. § -.
The New Regulations were issued in two parts, the latter superseding part of the former:
36 Fed. Reg. 23372-85 (1971); 87 Fed. Reg. 5120-35 (1972). Regulations unchanged by
the 1971 Act will hereinafter be cited as Regs. § -. The role of the appeal boards is determined by New Reg. §§ 1626-27.
2 The classification structure is established by New Reg. § 1622.
8 New Reg. § 1626 controls the entitlement to and mechanics of the appeal. This appeal may be before the appeal board with jurisdiction over either the registrants local
board or his current place of employment or residence. Reg. § 1626.3(b). If the registrant
is denied the classification he seeks by a divided vote of the appeal board, he may take
a further appeal to the National Appeal Board under the procedures of Reg. § 1627.
Because the analysis of issues for the National Appeal Board is exactly the same as that
for the other appeal boards, the former will not be specifically dealt with. All of the
appeal boards are charged only with the duty of finding facts and effecting the correct
classification. None has any rule-making authority.
4 Reg. § 1626.4(h); see United States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839, 8 SEL. Srav. L. REP.
8833 (3d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as SSLR]; Forsting v. United States, 429 F.2d 134,
3 SSLR. 3196 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally L. HERsnEyY, LEGAL AsPECrs OF SEr.rmr¢ SERvIcE
(rev. ed. 1969); Comment, Judicial Development of the Law of Selective Service Reopening, 69 MaEr. L. REv. 1074 (1971).
5 In general, the de novo classification by the appeal board is allowed to stand even
though the local board has committed error. It is presumed that the appeal board con-
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the appeal board proceeding is attended by a presumption of regularity.6

In the absence of contrary evidence, all actions of the appeal board are
presumed to be correct. Third, the evidence needed to rebut the presumption is difficult if not impossible to obtain. Records are kept only

of the classification sought, the classification awarded, and the vote.7
Even if the registrant appears, he is not entitled to record the meeting,8
and the deliberations are conducted in secret. 9 Finally, the scope of

sideration cured the local board's error. Hearings on the Administration and Operation
of the Draft Law Before the Special Subcomm. on the Draft of the House Comm. on the
Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-80, at 12861-70 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]; see United States v. Dudley, 436 F.2d 1057, 3 SSLR 3697 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Leavy, 422 F.2d 1155, 2 SSLR 3578 (9th Cir. 1970) (appeal board review cures
lack of evidence before local board); United States v. White, 421 F.2d 487, 2 SSLR 3423
(5th Cir. 1969); Storey v. United States, 370 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Neverline, 266 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1959). Not all cases go to the extreme limit of allowing
all local board errors to be cured by an appeal. There are at least two other lines of
cases. In one line, the appeal board is held to have effected no cure where it may have
been induced into prejudice against the registrant by some local board error. Atherton
v. United States, 430 F.2d 741, 3 SSLR 3265 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. French, 429
F.2d 391, 3 SSLR 3096 (9th Cir. 1970); Caverly v. United States, 429 F.2d 92, 3 SSLR 3194
(8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Vlasits, 422 F.2d 1267, 2 SSLR 3663 (4th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Pebbles, 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207
F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953). In the other line, some specific errors of the local board are
isolated, and it is held that errors of this particular sort will not be deemed cured by
the appeal. United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104, 3 SSLR 3850 (3d Cir. 1971) (appeal
board not informed of reasons for local board action); United States v. Freeman, 338 F.2d
246, 1 SSLR 3012 (7th Cir. 1968) (failure to reopen); United States ex rel. de Julio v.
Cooksey, - F. Supp. -, 4 SSLR 3641 (D.N.J. 1971) (local board failure to schedule meeting with appeal agent); United States v. Jagla, 330 F. Supp. 262, 3 SSLR 3541 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (adverse information in file not shown to registrant).
6 E.g., United States v. Harris, 436 F.2d 775, 3 SSLR 3713 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 981, rehearingdenied, 403 U.S. 924 (1971). The presumption is rebuttable upon
an affirmative showing by the registrant. At no time does the Government assume the
burden of showing procedural regularity. United States v. Bowen, 414 F.2d 1268, 2 SSLR
3165 (3rd Cir. 1969).
7 Reg. §§ 1604.27, 1626.21, 1626.27.
8 Letter to All State Directors 00-43, SSLR 2200:89 (Oct. 26, 1971).
9 There are no provisions allowing the registrant to be present during deliberations
or requiring the board to disclose matters considered. See Hearings on S. Res. 39 Before
the Subcomm. on AdministrativePracticeand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; cf. United States
v. Dudley, 436 F.2d 1057, 3 SSLR 3697 (6th Cir. 1971). The only effective way to glean information about the appeal board's procedure in a particular case is to question the board's
secretary. Interrogation of the members themselves is usually not allowed under the doctrine of United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). See Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d
901, 913, 1 SSLR 3088, 3092 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 394
U.S. 310, 1 SSLR 3358 (1969), rehearing en banc denied, 422 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir.), conviction aff'd, 430 F.2d 156, 3 SSLR 3100 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied, 3 SSLR
3248 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698, 4 SSLR 3258 (1971). Even questioning the secretary is of but limited value since years may have elapsed since the appeal
was decided, and the board may have decided hundreds of cases on the day in question.
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review in Selective Service cases is the "narrowest known to the law"; 10
board determinations will be upset only if there is no basis in fact to
support them."' As a practical matter, then, the decision of the appeal
board is in most cases final, as to both the relevant facts and the appli12
cation of the law to them.
In this context of finality, the procedural safeguards afforded the
registrant are of substantial interest. Currently, the registrant is entitled
to appear personally before the appeal board and to be informed, by a
10 Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957).

11 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). This basis in fact test was introduced
by Estep to create judicial review of classifications in criminal proceedings. Previously
there had been no review at all except by habeas corpus after the registrant had accepted
induction. United States ex rel. Hull v. Stalter, 151 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1945). There is
some evidence in the Estep opinion that the Court was searching for a way to liberalize
substantially the law, but the interpretation of Estep by the lower courts has been exceedingly narrow, and the Supreme Court itself later interpreted "basis in fact" to mean
that the tiniest scintilla of evidence would support the conviction. Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375, 380 (1955); United States v. Salamy, 379 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1967);
Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957); see Note, An Examination of
Fairness in Selective Service Procedure, 37 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 564, 579 (1969). See also
Hansen, The Basis-in-Fact Test in Judicial Review of Selective Service Reclassifications:
A Critical Analysis, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 453 (1971). An examination of recent cases suggests that there may be a gradual return to the more liberal rule that Estep attempted
to create. United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 4 SSLR 3678 (6th Cir. 1971); cf. 4 K.C.
DAvis, ADMINIwRATivE LAw TREATISE
28.12 (1970 Supp.). The cases now seem to establish four separate means of circumventing the rigid basis in fact test. First, some fact
situations can no longer be bases in fact for particular classifications. E.g., United States
v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299, 2 SSLR 3562 (4th Cir. 1970) (late claim); United States v. White,
421 F.2d 487, 2 SSLR 3423 (5th Cir. 1969) (atheism does not debar 1-0 claim); United
States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 2 SSLR 3233 (8th Cir. 1969) (claiming many deferments
does not impugn sincerity); see Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective
Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014, 1020 (1966). Second, the basis-in-fact test is also
avoided by disallowing board decisions that, while possibly having a valid basis in fact,
reflect an erroneous interpretation of the law. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
Third, where the board does not give reasons permitting determination whether it relied on a valid basis in fact, the conviction is often overturned. See text and notes at
notes 141-49 infra. Finally, where there is a valid basis in fact, but a procedure arguably
prejudicial to the registrant has been followed, that basis may be overridden by the
faulty procedure. See generally Sedler, The Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions: The View From Without and Within, 56 IowA L. REv. 1121 (1971).
12 See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1189; Note, Local Board Processing of Conscientious
Objectors, 1971 Wisc. L. REv. 318, 327 (1971). See generally Reisner, Selective Service Appeal
Boards and the Conscientious Objector Claimant: CongressionalStandards and Administrative Behavior, 1971 WIst. L. Rav. 521. Among the cases, see, for example, United States
v. Pompey, 445 F.2d 1313, 4 SSLR 3405 (3rd Cir. 1971). If the registrant fails to perfect
an appeal at all, he is often barred from presenting his defense to the court since he has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Compare Barnes v. United States, 387 F.2d
649 (5th Cir. 1967), with McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 2 SSLR 3023 (1969), and
Bradley v. Laird, 449 F.2d 898, 4 SSLR 3665 (10th Cir. 1971).
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brief statement, of the reasons for the appeal board's decision.13 Both
rights are innovations created by the 1971 extension of the Military
Selective Service Act, but not implemented by regulation until February, 1972. (This failure either to allow a personal appearance or to provide reasons is of more than historical interest. Many cases involving
these registrants are currently before the courts; still others are yet to
be filed.) Almost no other provision of the Act are relevant to the
functioning of the appeal boards, which are governed in general by
regulations of the "housekeeping" variety. 14 Nor does the registrant
receive the other procedural safeguards normally associated with administrative adjudications. 15 He is not allowed to be accompanied by
counsel,' 6 to confront adverse witnesses,' 7 to introduce witnesses on his
own behalf,' or to have access to a transcript of the proceedings.' He
has no right to hear or to rebut any preliminary opinion the board
20
may have formed about his case.
The absence of traditional due process safeguards here is underscored
by the presence of these safeguards in other adjudicatory proceedings
13 New Reg. § 1626.
14 1967 Act § 460(b) contains the only relevant provisions. Most regulations deal with
such matters as the qualifications of members and codes of honesty. Reg. §§ 1600, 1603.
All crucial appeal board regulations are collected under Reg. § 1626, which itself does
little more than require the board to consider the claim and direct how papers are to be
routed.
15 Compare Reg. §§ 1600 et seq. with Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551
et seq. (1970). The Selective Service System is specifically exempted from all but the freedom-of-information and prepublication-of-rules sections of the Administrative Procedure
Act. United States v. McDuffie, 433 F.2d 1163, 4 SSLR 3427 (5th Cir. 1971); Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970); 1967 Act § 463(b); 1971 Act § 101(a)(32).
16 New Reg. § 1626.4 does not permit anyone to accompany the registrant to the appearance before the appeal board. New Reg. § 1624.4(e) specifically forbids anyone acting
as counsel to accompany the registrant before the local board. This prohibition has been
upheld in ten of the eleven circuits. See United States v. Hosmer, 434 F.2d 209 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); cases collected in Note, Prohibition of Counsel at Selective Service Proceedings:The Impact of the Weller Case, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 478 (1971).
Contra, United States v. Weller, 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Calif. 1969), remanded on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 254, 8 SSLR 3737 (1971).
17 There are no such provisions in the regulations, and the registrant possesses no power
to subpoena them. Nor are there any cases giving the registrant such a right. See generally
Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALW. L.
REv. 2122 (1966).

18 Prior to the 1971 Act, no such right existed at any level. Their admission was discretionary with the local board. United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302, 2 SSLR 3668 (9th
Cir. 1970). New Reg. § 1626(d) still bars witnesses from appearing before the appeal board.
19 See United States v. Wood, 454 F.2d 765, 5 SSLR 3163 (4th Cir. 1972); SSLR PRACrICE
1080, at 1065 (1968).
MANIAL
20 New Reg. § 1626A(e) allows the registrant to present to the appeal board arguments
about information that the local board may have overlooked. But there is no provision
for verbal interchange with the appeal board by which the registrant may determine what
factors the board believes crucial so that he may attempt to address these problems.
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that may have substantially less impact on an individual's life. Other
cases dealing with procedural safeguards in adjudicatory determinations
may be examined for guidance in determining what rights the standards
of due process usually require. 21
In Goldberg v. Kelly,22 a case involving the termination of welfare
benefits, the Supreme Court ruled that the benefits could not be terminated until the recipient had been afforded a hearing "at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."2 3 For this hearing to be meaningful,
the Court said, the recipient had to be afforded the rights to be represented by counsel, to introduce witnesses on his own behalf, to confront and to cross-examine witnesses against him, to have a record of
the hearing, and to hear the reasons and evidence relied on by the
decision maker. These procedural safeguards are those normally afforded in a judicial hearing. Although in some administrative pro24
ceedings fewer safeguards are required than in this judicial model,
the minimum standards enumerated in Goldberg have been applied
to a wide variety of other administrative actions: entrance to and expulsion from public housing, 25 denial of student status, 26 withdrawal of
a license to transact business, 27 withdrawal of security clearance, 28 deportation proceedings, 29 revocation of parole,3 0 and dismissal from public employment. 31 Moreover, these safeguards protect the interests of the
21 See United States v. Weller, 509 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969), remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 401 U.S. 254 (1971); cf. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC. 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir.
1948), appeal dismissed as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949). See also 1 K.C. DAvis, supra note 11,
7.04 (1958, 1970 Supp.); Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAav. L. Rav. 364 (1942). At least one law review note develops the analogy
to other adjudicatory situations. Note, supra note 16, at 484-86. But see United States v.
Evans, 425 F.2d 302, 2 SSLR 3668 (9th Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein.
22 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cf. Hansen, supra note 11, at 465.
23 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
24 An example is proceedings that are merely investigatory. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420 (1960); see Newman, The Process of Prescribing"Due Process," 49 CA.,F. L. Rav. 215
(1961).
25 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970); Holmes v.
New York Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Williams v. White Plains
Housing Authority, 62 Misc. 2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
26 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368

U.S. 930 (1962).
27 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Goldsmith v. United States
Bd.of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
28 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); cf. Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443
(N.D. Cal. 1953), rev'd, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
29 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
80 United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
The majority position is the opposite, however. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 US. 957 (1963).

31 See Vitarelli v. United States, 359 US. 535 (1959).
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government as well as the individual. They facilitate appropriate classification in conformity with congressional intent.
The absence of procedural safeguards in appeal board determinations
32
engenders opportunities for error and abuse. The existence of unpaid
33
34
and inexpert boards, overloaded with work, no doubt causes many
errors prejudicial to the registrant. There is evidence that cases are
rushed through without the required de novo review3 5 and that incorrect standards are often applied to the facts.3 6 The importance of
the appeal board in its procedural context, coupled with the absence of
customary safeguards and the evidence of a significant quantum of
error, calls for a critical reexamination of the traditional due process
balance in Selective Service Cases.
I.

DUE PROCESS AND THE APPEAL BoARDs--A GENERAL BALANCE

In the early development of the Selective Service case law, courts were
reluctant to hold that the due process clause applied to determinations
made by draft boards.37 Review could be obtained only by habeas
corpus after induction, and then only if the Selective Service had failed
to follow the procedures it had prescribed for itself. 38 Because the draft
constitutes direct governmental action by which persons may be deprived of their liberty, courts have since recognized that Selective Service
32 Old Reg. § 1603.3. New Reg. § 1603.3 appears to leave open the possibility that appeal
board members might be paid.
33 The members are drawn from the general public and need possess no special knowledge. New Reg. § 1604.22. Old Reg. § 1604.22 specified that the board consist of one member
each from labor, industry, and agriculture and a lawyer and a physician. See Tigar &
Zweben, Selective Service: Some Certain Problems and Some Tentative Answers, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 510, 527 (1969).
34 See text and notes at notes 85-89 infra.
35 See notes 115-122 infra; cf. United States v. Mantione, - F. Supp. -, 5 SSLR 3085
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 62, 153; Shattuck, Record Keeping
Obligations of Local Boards, 1 SSLR 4015, 4018-9 (1968); White, Processing Conscientious
Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 673 (1968); Comment,
supra note 17, at 2158; Note, 1971 Wisc. L. REv. 318, 327.
36 Some irregularity is obviously shown by the fact that not all Selective Service prosecutions result in convictions. See SSLR 6003 (1971); 4 SSLR 70 (1971). There has also been
one statistical study disclosing the extent to which illegal standards are applied by appeal
boards. Reisner, supra note 12, reports on a survey of 272 actual cases on appeal. As one
example, while 13.5 percent of all claimants received 1-0 status, of the 82 who failed to
claim an affiliation with an organized religion, not one received a 1-0, even though all
relevant court decisions hold that such affiliation is irrelevant to the conscientious objector
claim.
37 Gen. Louis B. Hershey supported the thesis that "it doesn't matter how fair it is,"
as long as it "gets the men." Comment, 44 NoTR DAME LAW. 469, 474 (1969).
38 Compare Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), and Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114 (1946), with Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944); Koch v. United States,
150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. Rinko, 147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1945); and United
States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1944).
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9
procedures must conform to the requirements of due process.3 The
courts have, however, interpreted due process as applied to the Selective
Service appeal boards to consist solely of the right to a full and fair
hearing, or to a "meaningful appeal. 40 Moreover, courts have been
reluctant to insure that the specific safeguards that make a full and fair
hearing possible (or likely) are actually employed.
Courts have invariably decided questions of due process in Selective
Service proceedings by balancing the interests of the individual against
those of national security. In performing this task, they have come to
41
a position strongly weighted in favor of national security claims. A
42 That decision upcharacteristic example is United States v. Nugent.
held a refusal to disclose to the registrant the contents of an FBI report
on his character and background that was to be used by the Department of Justice hearing examiner in determining whether to recommend him for conscientious objector status. Although the court acknowledged that due process required that the registrant be given a
"fair opportunity to . . . speak his piece" 43 at the hearing and that
ignorance of the contents of the report might frustrate this right, it
held the expeditious processing of draft cases to be sufficient reason for
denying the registrant any right that might entail even a short delay in
his processing. 44
In this and other opinions, courts have made certain unexamined
assumptions about the needs of national security and the interests of
the individual. The exposition of these assumptions, and an examination of their validity, is necessary if a correct balance is to be struck.

A. The National Security Interest
Behind the consistent denial of procedural safeguards on the ground
of national security,4 5 lie three separate assumptions: (1) in order to in39 See Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S.
1 (1953). Contra, United States v. Mientke, 387 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1011 (1967).
40 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 127 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); see
Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 2 SSLR 3367 (1970); Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397, 404 (1955); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). See generally Sedler,
supra note 11; Comment, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 11.
41 Normally, the court will simply recite that rapid processing is necessary in the interest
of national defense. The cases collected in note 16 supra on the denial of counsel provide
excellent examples of this. Such cases as United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302, 2 SSLR 3668
(9th Cir. 1970), also demonstrate the propensity of courts to dismiss the interest of the
registrant merely because the proceeding is administrative, without examining the nature
of that interest at all. See cases cited note 66 infra; Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 95.
42 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id. at 10.
45 See H.R. REP. No. 92-433, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (Conference Committee Report
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duct large numbers of men, the Selective Service must be able to process
each case quickly; (2) procedural safeguards will slow this processing unacceptably; (3) the demand for rapid processing does not vary but remains constant in both wartime and peacetime. All three of these
assumptions are unwarranted.
1. Must Each Case be Processed Quickly? To answer this question,
two situations must be distinguished: the case of rapid mobilization
and the case of constant high demand for inductees. 4 When rapid
mobilization is required, the stock of persons utilized are only those
with a final 1-A classification. Those who are not I-A, or whose classifications are being appealed, will not be available for a length of time.
The appeal process is already so lengthy that persons involved in it
are unreachable for induction for several months.4 7 Those not classified
I-A must be reclassified I-A and will have the opportunity to create
delay by taking appeals. Thus, the size of the 1-A pool that has been
maintained, and not the marginal increase in processing time that safeguards might cause, will be critical during mobilization. Moreover, the
Selective Service System has recently taken steps to decrease the size
of the 1-A pool in order to reduce administrative costs. 48 This suggests that the military may no longer consider rapid mobilization to be
a real or important possibility.
Similarly, there is also no need for rapid processing of individuals
when calls are constantly high since in the long run the number of men
available for induction will not be affected by the length of time it
takes to process them to 1-A status. Individual delays in processing can
increase the average age of the inductees, but they cannot affect the
number of inductees available. It is possible that affording more proon the 1971 Act); Sedler, supra note 11, at 1141; Comment, supra note 17, at 2145; Note,
The New Draft Law: Its Failures and Future, 19 CASE W. Rus. L. Rav. 292, 319-20 (1968).
46 A third possible case, a situation in which there is slight and constant demand for

inductees, obviously does not require rapid processing of any sort.
47 New Reg. §§ 1624, 1626 provide for a series of appeal board actions and registrant
responses, each of which may take a month. In addition, if the registrant misses a meeting
for cause, it may be rescheduled. It has become standard practice among draft counselors
to count on the availability of a delay of at least four months. A registrant will take even
longer to be reclassified out of 1-H since no information is gathered on him while he is
in the holding category, and a series of questionnaires and a physical examination may
have to be added to delays resulting from appearances and appeals.
48 New Reg. §§ 1622.18, 1624.1(a), 1626.1. Registrants unlikely to be called under current
call rates are classified 1-H. Before they may be called during a mobilization, they must
be reclassified 1-A, and all rights of appearance and appeal again become available to them.
The 1-H category was created to ease the work load of the Selective Service by virtually
deactivating large numbers of files, indicating that the Service values its own current
administrative convenience more than the need for haste in possible future mobilization.
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cedural safeguards would result in more deferments, thus reducing the
number of men available for induction. But any objection to such a
reduction is a quarrel not with the safeguards themselves, but with the
congressional policy regarding deferments; the remedy lies in a changed
deferment structure, not in a paucity of safeguards. Ultimately, the
flexible nature of the draft structure eliminates the danger that procedural safeguards would necessarily impede meeting military demands.
When the demand for men is great, Congress reduces the number of
available deferments and makes the substantive criteria for obtaining
49
them more restrictive than during times of low demand.
That the system can tolerate lengthy processing procedures for a
substantial number of inductees is shown by the willingness of Congress
to continue through three wars the system by which the Department of
Justice investigated and made recommendations regarding conscientious
objector applicants. 50 Each investigation consumed eight months to a
year, and the number of such investigations was substantial, although
less than one percent of all registrants. 51 The point is simply that there
is leeway in the Selective Service System for many registrants to be
permitted long delays in processing without jeopardizing the national
52
security interest. Each case need not be processed quickly.
2. Would Safeguards Slow Processing? Awarding additional procedural safeguards would not necessarily increase the length of the appeal board proceedings. A recent Selective Service regulation announced
a fifteen-minute limit on the length of a personal appearance before
the local board.5 3 Presumably, this limitation could be retained whether
or not a lawyer were allowed to be present. In fact, safeguards might
also produce some time savings. An attorney might, if allowed to be
49 During World War II, there were few deferments. The only one possessed by any
considerable number of men was that of a worker in an essential industry. The stringent
criteria for hardship and physical deferments or exemptions made them almost impossible
to acquire.
S0 For the details of the procedure, see text and notes at notes 134-38 infra. It was
terminated for budgetary reasons when the 1967 Act was passed, but had been in effect
during World War II and the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts.
51 See 1942 SEL. SERv. ANN. REP. 255-61. The number rose steadily throughout World
War II. 1945 S.. SERv. ANN. REP. 179, 332.
52 In the wake of the new procedural rights granted by Congress in the 1971 Act, at
least one court has shown an increased willingness to tolerate some delays in processing
even beyond those specifically authorized by Congress:
We need hardly concern ourselves further about the inconvenience to the Selective
Service System which may be caused by the courts which insist upon administrative
due process. Congress has in Section 22 gone much further than the courts have
heretofore seen fit to go.
United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird, 453 F.2d 625, 4 SSLR 3739, 3743 (3d Cir. 1971).
53 New Reg. § 1624.4(c).
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present before the local board or the appeal board, help to curtail procedural and legal errors that lengthen processing time by necessitating
time-consuming appeals or trials. Other rights, such as access to a transcript, could be provided without creating significant delay.5 4
The argument is sometimes advanced that safeguards must be avoided
since, if all registrants exercised all of their rights, the system could be
brought to a halt.5 5 As a practical matter, however, all registrants do
not use all of their present rights. A very small percentage of registrants
appeal from an adverse classification. 56 Certainly, procedures that work
well under usual circumstances should not be precluded merely because
of an extremely remote possibility of an extraordinary circumstance.
Even if substantial numbers of registrants took advantage of new
and enlarged procedural safeguards, the processing of appeals could
still be maintained at any necessary or desired rate by the addition of
more personnel to the administrative structure. Appeal board members
are volunteers, and staff requirements are not heavy, so that an increase
in personnel would not be unbearably costly.57 Seen in this light, the

question is not whether the national security should be sacrificed to
afford individual rights, but whether staff requirements should be increased to achieve this result.
Moreover, the military itself provides the model for the preservation
of due process rights through adequate staffing. 8 When a serviceman
applies for an in-service conscientious objector discharge, he is assigned,
if possible, to duties consistent with his asserted beliefs, and he is
54 The only delay involved is the time required to set up a tape recorder at the beginning
of each board session and to change tapes as they run out.
55 This premise underlies all of the arguments that speed is necessary to protect the
national security, but it is often made explicitly as well. See Senate Hearings, supra note 9,
at 95.
56 1971 SEL. SERV. SEMIANN. REP. 53; NATIONAL ADVISORY COasar'N ON SFLECTIVE SERVICE,
IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE 28, 110 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as MARSHALL REPORT].

57 There are approximately one hundred appeal boards in the country. Marshall Report,
supra note 56, at 110-11. To expand this number would not require substantial additional
staff since the current staff already handles all the paperwork. Additional board members
are costless since they are volunteers. Thus, only creation of the new boards in new
geographic locations would bring about any substantial increase in costs.
58 The procedures are set forth in Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, SSLR 2325
(Aug. 20, 1971). See generally Hansen, Judicial Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector
Claims, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 975 (1970). It should be noted that these rights are provided
even though few would argue that the serviceman has a "right" to a conscientious objector
discharge, but that being classified 1-0 under Selective Service is a mere "privilege."
Logically, either both are rights or neither is. If a distinction can be made at all, the
in-service case looks even more like a privilege. Holdings that in-service safeguards are
required by due process are not uncommon. Robin v. Secretary of the Army, - F. Supp.
-,
4 SSLR 3508 (D.D.C. 1971); Hansen, supra.
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interviewed by a chaplain, a psychiatrist, and a hearing officer. Before
the hearing officer, he may be accompanied by counsel, introduce witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and make a transcript of the
proceedings. The hearing officer must furnish recommendations and
reasons therefor, to which the serviceman may reply. The hearing officer's report is forwarded to the legal staff, which conducts a review
for completeness and legal sufficiency. A final decision on the case is
then made by the headquarters of the military service involved, which
must render an opinion and allow the serviceman to inspect and to
reply to any additional information on which it relies. Final review
may be had by habeas corpus.5 9 It is difficult to see how granting similar
safeguards outside the military would harm the national security more
than granting them within, provided that staffing is sufficient to prevent
unnecessary delay.
3. Is Rapid Processing Always Required? If, as suggested above,
rapid processing of every individual is not necessary to the national
security and safeguards do not appreciably slow processing, then safeguards should be afforded even during time of war. During time of
peace, the argument is even more compelling since in such periods the
national security interest should be accorded far less weight in the
balancing process. Indeed, since only the importance of the national
security interest justifies the denial of procedural safeguards, a case can
be made independently that during times of relative tranquility individual rights should regain their dominance. Yet to date no court has
made this sensible distinction."0 There is precedent for it in the expansive powers the President possesses during wartime. Further, as
the language of Goldberg v. Kelly6l suggests, the balance of individual
rights versus governmental need is a temporal one and will change
62
when appropriate to meet changing needs.
The existence of safeguards during peacetime would in no way impede the Selective Service from raising an army rapidly during a mobilization. As has already been shown, the mobilization depends on the
size of the 1-A pool and not on the availability of safeguards. By the
59 This sometimes raises complex jurisdictional problems. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401
U.S. 487, 3 SSLR 3753 (1971); Hansen, The Jurisdictional Bases of Federal Court Review
of Denials of Administrative Dischargesfrom the Military,3 SSLR 4001, 4 SSLR 4001 (1971).
60 The reason for the failure to make such a distinction is no doubt the assumption
that Selective Service must be able to process everyone quickly should a mobilization be

required.
61 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970).
62 Similarly, the doctrine of prior restraints on publication may vary with the nature
of the material and its relation to the war status of the United States, See New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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time the 1-A pool has been exhausted, enough time will have elapsed
for Congress to tailor the procedural safeguards and the classification
structure to the needs at hand.6 3 A distinction between rights during
war and rights during peace is both appropriate and necessary and has
received the approval of Justice Frankfurter in another context: "The
enemy is not yet so near the gate that we should allow allow respect
for traditions of fairness, which has heretofore prevailed in this country,
to be overborne by military exigencies."' '
B.

The Individual's Interest

The weight assigned by courts to the individual interests involved in
Selective Service adjudication has normally been slight.65 Courts have
answered the contentions of registrants with two general assertions:
First, that since the Selective Service is an administrative agency, the
registrant must settle for few safeguards, 66 and second, that no registrant
67
is entitled to any deferment except as a privilege granted by Congress.
Neither assertion confronts the critical issues. Many other administrative proceedings are attended by full judicial safeguards. 6 Clearly, what
is critical to due process is not the verbal category in which the proceeding is put, but the nature of the underlying interests. 69 Similarly, the
privilege doctrine merely denotes that category of things the court has
decided not to protect. The particular origin of the underlying rights is
not determinative since Congress can create both "privileges" and
63 During World War II, for example, men up to age forty-five were required to register.
During 1942, about two-thirds of all those of age were liable; of the 14 million not liable,

13 million were in essential occupations and the rest physically unfit or deferred for extreme
hardship. 1942 SEL. SERV. ANN. REP. 10. The advent of the Vietnamese conflict saw student
deferment criteria tightened and marriage and paternity deferments ended. But still,
during the height of the conflict, of 33 million registrants only 1 million were available
for induction. 1968 SL. SRv.SEmrANN. RaP. 4. Nineteen seventy-one was marked by further
diminution of deferments, but this seems to reflect a new striving for equity rather than
any attempt to increase the number available for induction.

64 United States v. Nugent, 846 U.S. 1, 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65 E.g., United States v. Sturgis, 842 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1965).
66 E.g., United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302, 2 SSLR 3668 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Mientke, 387 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1967).
67 E.g., Haven v. United States, 403 F.2d 384, 1 SSLR 3269 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1114 (1969); Salamy v. United States, 379 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1967); Storey
v. United States, 370 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966); Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 91; Com-

ment, supra note 11.
68 See cases cited notes 22-31 supra.

69 This is the standard framework within which due process arguments are made. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Hannah v. Larche, 863 U.S. 420 (1960); Greene v.
McElroy, 860 U.S. 474 (1959); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 845 U.S. 206
(1953) (Black, Douglas, Jackson, and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting); Parker v. Lester, 112
F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
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"rights." 70 Again, it is the nature of the underlying interest that is
determinative. This point was emphasized in Goldberg v. Kelly, 71 in
which the Court held that due process safeguards apply to the withdrawal of welfare benefits, even though welfare benefits had always
been termed a privilege. The Court found that due process safeguards
must be afforded when an individual may be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss"172 if a benefit is withdrawn. Draft deferments would seem
to qualify under this rule.
The interest of the registrant may be divided into two components:
the potential for individual hardship should a particular proceeding
result in a miscarriage of justice and the availability of effective review
of that proceeding. Courts characteristically respond cryptically to
these components, noting that "the appeal board is not a criminal proceeding," that it does not actually induct the registrant, or that judicial
review is always available. 73 Presumably, the procedural safeguards
lacking before the appeal board will be provided in the courtroom.
Although the appeal board proceeding is not technically a criminal
proceeding, an adverse determination by the appeal board has a substantially similar result. Review of its factual determinations and discretionary actions in any civil preinduction proceeding is expressly
barred by the Act.74 Although some exceptions to that bar have been
created, they reach only "blatant lawlessness" in the procedure of the
board. Direct review of a Selective Service decision before induction
is therefore usually available only in a criminal prosecution. If the
registrant accepts induction, he may have review of his classification by
70 See 1 K.C. DAvis, supra note 11,

7 (1958, 1970 Supp.).

397 U.S. 254 (1970). Many of the cases at notes 24-81 supra also represent privileges
that have been turned into rights. Cf. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11,
393 U.S. 233, 1 SSLR 3215 (1968) (4-D status held to be a right).
72 897 U.S. at 262-63.
78 Cases denying the registrant the right to have a lawyer present, cited note 16 supra,
are an example.
74 1967 Act § 460(b) provides that all Selective Service determinations shall be final,
thus precluding preinduction review. The courts have made some inroads against this
preclusion, and review wil sometimes be granted when the appeal board has denied the
registrant a statutory right or utilized a procedure that is blatantly lawless. No action is
reviewable if it is discretionary on the part of the board, however, and therefore classification decisions made within procedures that are not blatantly lawless are immune from
preinduction attack. Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 7, 92 S. Ct. 1062, 5 SSLR 3207
(1972); Breen v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 16, 896 U.S. 460, 2 SSLR 3373
(1970); Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256, 1 SSLR 3220 (1968); Oestereich v. Selective Serv.
Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 893 U.S. 23, 1 SSLR 3215 (1968); Winick, Direct Judicial Review
of the Actions of the Selective Service System, 69 MicH. L. RPv. 55 (1970); O'Neil, Review
of Selective Service Reclassifications, 37 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 536 (1969); Comment, The
Expanded Availability of Preinduction Judicial Review, 44 TEmp. L.Q. 127 (1970).
71
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habeas corpus, 75 but then he is subject to the military command in

the interim and after an adverse decision; additionally, the standard for
review of the Selective Service decision is the same as that in the criminal prosecution. In the prosecution of habeas corpus proceedings, the
registrant is accorded the traditional due process safeguards. But this
day in court hardly provides an adequate opportunity for challenging
his classification. All the Government need prove to secure conviction
or defeat habeas corpus is that there was an induction. order outstanding.
The registrant must affirmatively prove that this induction order was
issued illegally.76 As noted previously, however, the juxtaposition of the

presumption of regularity and the secrecy of the proceedings severely
limits the potential for effective review.77 Moreover, the order is challengable only on the ground that no basis in fact for it existed. This
narrow standard of review results in judicial deference to any board
decision absent the most flagrant abuse of discretion. The severe effect of this standard is accentuated by the criminal penalty involved.
The normal standard of "innocent unless proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt" is effectively reversed to "guilty unless there is no
78s
basis in fact for guilt."
If the appeal board denies his claim, the registrant is therefore faced
with either the loss of his liberty through induction or the probability
of imprisonment. In re Gault7 9 has established that even when a juvenile is faced with a short penalty in a technically noncriminal proceeding, the standard due process safeguards are necessary. The same
reasoning would seem to apply to appeal board decisions.
The only solution to the inequities of the present system lies in
recognizing the fact that the appeal board makes factual determinations
critical to conviction and in providing safeguards accordingly. The
full import of the appeal board decision and the individual stake in
75 See United States v. Eisdorfer, 299 F. Supp. 975, 2 SSLR 3002 (E.D.N.Y.), cert. granted,
396 U.S. 884, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 1066 (1969); cf. Gutknecht v. United States, 396
U.S. 295, 2 SSLR 3367 (1970); Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 150, 163 (1945).
76 See SSLR PRAcncE MANUAL 1 2002-05 (1968).
77 See text and notes at notes 6-21 supra.
78 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), and subsequent cases applying the
basis-in-fact test.
79 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The analogy to Gault is often made in other Selective Service
contexts, always to point out that a serious interest and potential penalty is deserving of
procedural safeguards. See United States v. Weller, 809 F. Supp. 50, 2 SSLR 3229 (N.D.
Cal. 1969), vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 401 U.S. 254, 3 SSLR 3737
(1971); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 1 SSLR 8224 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Note,
supra note 35, at 327. Contra, United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 785 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied (with opinion), 391 U.S. 936, 1 SSLR 3084 (1967).
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the controversy should be weighed in the due process balance.8 0 The
resolution of that balance in specific problems raised by the appeal
board proceeding may now be considered.
II.

DUE PROCESS AND THE APPEAL

BOARDS-A

SPECIFIc BALANCE

Perhaps the right that has received the most attention in the commentary is the right to be accompanied by counsel before the boards. 8 '
This right has been conclusively rejected by the courts and will not be
dealt with here. 2 Some other basic rights, such as the right to introduce
witnesses on one's own behalf, have been granted at the local board
but not the appeal board level.8 3 A convincing case can be made that
the registrant is entitled to the same rights before the appeal board,
which is charged with making a de novo review, that he possesses in
relation to the local board. There is a growing body of cases so holding,
although none of them yet deals with the right to introduce witnesses.8 4
Such an extension would seem to be logical. Other problems, which
seem to be particular to or more important in the appeal board context, are discussed next.
A.

The Right to a Full and Fair Hearing-Due Process and Administrative Overload.

There is extensive evidence that the appeal boards are swamped with
work. Appeal board members are volunteers who meet for short periods
of time-typically three or four hours-once or twice per month. In
these short meetings, the boards have many cases to decide. The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found in 1967 that
caseloads for a single board ran as high as 3,000 cases per year; 5 the
number of appeals has increased since then.8 6 One appeal board decided
867 cases in a two-hour meeting.8 7 This overload has been admitted
8o See Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1955); Comment, supra note 17;
Comment, supra note 11. It might also be argued that a difference exists in the weight of
this argument between wartime and peacetime. It is less important to be objectively "fair"
when selecting the few who will not go during wartime than in selecting those who will be
required to bear an extraordinary burden shared by few of their fellow citizens.
81 See cases and discussions summarized in Comment, supra note 11; Note, supra note 16.
82 See note 16 supra.
83 New Reg. §§ 1624, 1626.
84 Eg., United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472, 4 SSLR 3199 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839, 3 SSLR 3833 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Kember,
437 F.2d 534, 3 SSLR 3539 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971).
85 MARsHALL RaPouR, supra note 58, at 28.
So See 1968-71 SEL. SERV. SEMIANN. REP.; ci. Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards in
Selective Service Cases 1, 19 HAsrINGs L.J. 1313, 1324 (1968); Sedler, supra note 11, at 1189.
87 Margolis, Trying a Case Under the Selective Service Law, 26 GUILD PRACTITIONER 100,
103 (1967).
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by Selective Service officials in congressional testimony, 88 although exact
data on individual boards have been kept secret. In some cases involving
judicial challenges to appeal board decisions, average times of less than
thirty seconds per appeal have been revealed.8 9
Such summary proceedings arguably violate Selective Service regulations,90 but the need for reform goes beyond the simple demand that

regulations be meticulously followed. 91 A minimum due process requirement was established in Morgan v. United States,92 in which the
Supreme Court held that the "official" decision maker must at least be
sufficiently involved with the actual decision to know what he is approving. 93 This standard alone calls into serious question the validity
of some appeal board decisions. Beyond that, however, the Supreme
Court cases have gone no further than to assert repeatedly the need for
the Selective Service to provide procedural fairness.9 It remains necessary to give specific content to that requirement in the context of procedural overload. This will be aproached in two ways: (1) by dealing
with the overload itself and (2) by dealing with the file resume, one
method by which the Selective Service has attempted to meet the
problem.
1. The A bridged Hearing.There are several cases dealing with the
problem of overload in which contentions of denial of a full and fair
88 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 245; cf. Hearings on Selective Service and Military
Compensation Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 339 (1971).
89 See cases cited notes 102-11 infra.
90 The abridged appeal procedures apparently violate Reg. § 1626, which requires the
appeal board to examine fully and independently each file and to decide the case on the
basis of all the evidence, and Old Reg. § 1604.22, which required state directors to appoint
new panels whenever the caseload became too great for existing panels to handle. Cf.
Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 416 (1970) ("[b]ecause of the narrowly limited scope
of judicial review available to a registrant, the opportunity for full administrative review

is indispensible to the operation of the Selective Service System'); Sedler, supra note 11, at
1149, 1188-91.
91 This principle that, when every requirement of due process has been observed by the
board, its fact decisions, unless wholly unsupported, are not subject to review, makes
it certain that [the board must follow Selective Service regulations]. Under this
principle, it is the essence of the validity of board orders and of the crime of disobeying them that all procedural requirements be strictly and faithfully followed,
and a showing of failure to follow them with such strictness and fidelity will invalidate
the order of the board and a conviction based thereon.
Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1955). The possibilities for this defense
of failure to follow procedure and details of the way in which it is raised are fully
explored in Sedler, supra note 11.
92 298 U.S. 468 (1936); 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
93 Cf. Reg. §§ 1626.23-24. The behavior that Morgan condemned may be even more
excusable than the Selective Service situation since the decision maker in Morgan had a
power to subdelegate that the appeal board lacks.
84 See cases cited note 40 supra.
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hearing are dismissed, almost without discussion. In one Ninth Circuit
case, the entire relevant portion of the opinion is as follows:
Appellant complains of the large number of appeals decided by
the appeal board in a relatively short period of time. The record
is completely devoid of evidence on the nature of the other matters
considered by the appeal board or the time devoted to an evaluation of appellant's appeal. In these circumstances, we are required
to assume that the appeal board considered all pertinent material
in appellant's file...
This presumption of regularity has been
recognized and applied by us to both local and appeal board
actions. 95
The court may have been unaware of the difficulty of presenting to it
any other evidence of the appeal board proceedings. The court may
also have relied on the nature of the material in the registrant's file or
assumed that the registrant's claim was given a full hearing with time
saved from the speedy processing of "frivolous" claims. The opinion
does not discuss these possibilities. But if the decision is taken at face
value, this use of the presumption of regularity to dismiss due process
claims is particularly objectionable since the evidence needed to rebut
the presumption is simply unavailable. To reject the sort of circumstantial evidence the registrant presented is to insulate the appeal board
from almost all challenges.9 6
Challenges to short appeals have met with two other types of rebuff
from the courts. The first is an assertion that average length of appeal
can never be a useful piece of evidence. One court stated, for example:
[There is no way to determine from the record how much time
was spent on any single case. It is idle to try the due process
question on the basis of whether the Board spent 15 seconds or 15
minutes on the defendant's claim. The secretary of the Local Board
testified that she could not recall how much time was spent on it,
but she did confirm that the matter was considered and recorded in
the files in the regular course of business. This ...

is as much as

the defendant is entitled to, insofar as due process is concerned. 97
15 United States v. Neckels, 451 F.2d 709, 4 SSLR 3713 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
Accord, United States v. Kember, 437 F.2d 534, 3 SSLR 3539 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 912 (1971). The only knowledge of the claim in Kember is from the brief filed in
support of a request for certiorari. The average appeal before Kember's appeal board
was apparently thirty-five seconds. The court dismissed the claim, stating: "Kember does

not present any authority in support of his other contentions on this branch of the case.
We are satisfied that he was not deprived of due process of law in the respects described."
Id. at 538, 3 SSLR at 3540.
96 For the kinds of available information on appeal board behavior, see notes 7-12 supra.
97 United States v. Losczyk, - F. Supp. -, 4 SSLR 3766 (N.). IlL. 1971); accord, United
States v. Brown, 338 F. Supp. 409, 5 SSLR 3196 (N.D. IMI. 1972).
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The court appeared to assume that a consideration lasting but fifteen
seconds would afford due process. It is difficult to believe, however,
that any court could find that a consideration barely long enough to
read the registrant's name and address can conform to due process.
It is similarly not true, contrary to the court's assertion, that due process
is always satisfied by a mere consideration and filing in the regular
course, if that course provides no hearing at all.98
The second type of rebuff is found in Strople v. Local Board No.
60. 99 The court, faced with a short average time for appeal board decisions, denominated that fact a mere "procedural irregularity." This,
the court held, did not rise to the standard of "blatant lawlessness"
in procedure required to make a case an appropriate one for judicial
review before an induction order has been refused.1 00 Significantly, the
court reserved the question whether the shortness of the appeal would
be a sufficient defense to a criminal prosecution. The court also noted
that it could not find the shortness of the appeal to be blatantly lawless
since there was no precedent for such a decision. In that, it was simply
mistaken. 101
A better approach to the problem, adopted by numerous courts, is
represented by the leading case of United States v. Wallen.10 2 The appeal board that had considered Wallen's claim for conscientious objector status had heard 122 claims at a two-hour meeting, an average of
59.01 seconds per case. The court referred to several other opinions
that establish, in a general way, the right to a full and fair hearing on
appeal,10 3 and went on to say:
It does not require lengthy argument to this court to convince
that a 59 second appeal is not a meaningful appeal proceeding.
It is almost a routine "rubber stamp" operation.... Such an appeal does not afford defendant the rights which Congress must have
intended .... The proceeding is offensive to the concept of due
process ....

04

98 See Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).

99 330 F. Supp. 187, 4 SSLR 3614 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
1OO See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 237, 1 SSLR 3215,
3216 (1968). The court stated that the short appeal was not blatantly lawless since it was
not in violation of a specific statutory command. That decision, if followed, would produce
the curious result that it is blatant lawlessness to deny the registrant statutory rights, but
mere irregularity to deny him constitutionally guaranteed rights.
101 See Slettehaugh v. Tarr, 322 F. Supp. 180, 4 SSLR 3106 (D. Minn. 1971).
102 315 F. Supp. 459, 3 SSLR 3125 (D. Minn. 1970).
103 Bates v. United States, 348 U.S. 966 (1955); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407
(1955); Mintz v. Howlett, 207 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1953); Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95
(8th Cir. 1949); Nevarez Bengoechea v. Micheli, 295 F. Supp. 257 (D.P.R. 1969); United
States v. Zasadni, 206 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
104 315 F. Supp. 459, 460-61, 8 SSLR 3125, 3126 (D. Minn. 1970).
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The presumption of regularity was held contravened by the shortness
of the appeal:
Even though other files may not be as thick as defendant's it seems
to the court impossible that the board could have acted on any
of the matters and cases before it in two hours with any detailed
study or consideration ....

To the extent that more than 59.01

seconds was spent [on defendant's file], less was of course spent on
the other cases. 105
The court also noted that it could not consider the Government's claim
that the registrant was not entitled to the classification he sought and
was therefore not prejudiced by the shortness of the appeal. The court
answered that since it had no power to sit as a "super draft board," it
could not determine whether the registrant was so entitled.
In several subsequent cases, courts have agreed with the holding in
Wallen. In United States ex rel. Scott v. La France,10 the court expanded the scope of Wallen. The appeal board in Scott had heard 94
cases during a three-hour meeting, an average of about 2.5 minutes
per case. The court had no trouble finding that due process had been
denied the registrant. That brevity of appeal may satisfy the criterion
of blatant lawlessness is demonstrated by Slettehaugh v. Tarr.i0 7 There,
the registrant's appeal board had heard 262 cases during its 285-minute
meeting. The registrant's file contained 103 documents, 22 of which
were directly relevant to his claim for a hardship deferment. The judge
noted that it had taken him more than an hour just to read the file and
therefore that the average time of 64 seconds during which the appeal
board had to read the file and to consider and vote on the case was a
violation of due process and so blatantly lawless as to make the case
an appropriate one for preinduction review.
In all such cases, courts begin with the standard presumption of
regularity. The issue in each case is what evidentiary showing the court
will require to rebut that presumption and therefore to establish a
prima facie case of irregularity. Once this showing of irregularity has
been made, the burden falls on the appeal board to show that the particular registrant indeed received full consideration. In the usual case,
the only evidence tending to show irregularity is the quantum of time
spent by an appeal board per average appeal. To date, however, no
court has ventured a general standard for using the quantum-of-time
criterion.
Slettehaugh suggests that there is some time limit (perhaps as much
Id. at 460.
100 - F. Supp. -, 4 SSLR 3493 (N.D. Ohio 1971); accord, United States v. Weaver, F. Supp. -, 5 SSLR 3286 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
107 322 F. Supp. 180, 4 SSLR 3106 (D. Minn. 1971).
105
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as ten minutes) beyond which the consideration will always be deemed
sufficient, absent a showing by the registrant of special prejudice. 08
Wallen and similar cases suggest, when taken together, that an average
of two and one-half minutes will not suffice and that the presumption of
regularity will be reversed if the record shows a lesser average. Since
there are no cases currently in the four-to-ten-minute average, one can
only speculate on courts' reactions to such fact situations. The minimum
rule to be drawn from the cases, then, is that there will be a presumption of irregularity when the record shows an extremely short average
appeal.
It is important to recognize that the Wallen test puts no undue
burden on the Government. Where a fair hearing has in fact been
granted to the registrant, the Government will have no difficulty in
bearing the burden of proof, even in the context of a procedural overload. There are several ways in which the Government can prove that
the registrant received full consideration.
In United States v. Woloszczuk, 109 the registrant's claim had been
one of 235 cases considered during a 210-minute meeting. The Government admitted that the registrant's claim for 4-D ministerial deferment
presented some difficult problems for the board's consideration. The
clerk testified, however, that such difficult claims were regularly given
additional attention in the time "saved" from the summary disposition
of frivolous appeals and that the registrant's claim in particular had
received special attention. The registrant, who had been classified 1-A
prior to his appeal, had requested 4-D. The appeal board changed his
classification to 1-0. The court held that the evidence of special attention, together with the obvious fact that enough attention had been
given to grant a classification different from that which the local board
had granted, established that the appeal board had met the minimum
standard of a full and fair hearing.
Similarly, a claim frivolous on its face would not be entitled to any
specific length of time per average appeal. In United States v. Young," 0
this procedure was implicitly adopted. The average time per appeal
before the registrant's board had been forty-seven seconds. The registrant's claim, however, was for a 3-A fatherhood deferment, from which
he was statutorily barred by virtue of his earlier possession of a 2-S
108 Although the ten-minute consideration in Slettehaugh was afforded by the local and
not the appeal board, the basic question of what conclusion the courts will draw from
length alone remains.
-109 828 F. Supp. 696, 4 SSLE, 3557 (D. Mass. 1971); accord, United States v. Brown, 338
F. Supp. 409, 5 SSLR 3196 (N.D. fli. 1972).
110 324 F. Supp. 69, 3 SSLR 3381 (D. Minn. 1970).
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student deferment. The denial of his claim did not depend on any factfinding duty of the board, nor did the board have any discretionary
authority. Since there were no issues for the appeal board to resolve,
the court held it unnecessary to require the board to spend any fixed
time considering the frivolous claim.
The decisions also suggest that adjustments in the quantum of time
necessary to reverse the presumption of regularity will be made in
an unusually simple or unusually complex case. United States v. Hansen"' deals with an unusually simple claim involving the interpretation of medical reports in the registrant's file. The claim was not a
frivolous one since the registrant was entitled to his claim if the evidence supported it, and he had submitted some such evidence. The
court held, however, that the reports were "self-evident" and that there
was therefore no need for the average appeal to be of any particular
length. The court contrasted the self-evident nature of the medical
reports to the "insight and reflection" required of the appeal board
12
during the consideration of a conscientious objector claim.1
Consideration by courts of the amount of time spent by appeal
boards on cases should bring the Selective Service System closer to the
ideal of a fair hearing for every registrant. For those registrants who
take advantage of the right, effective March, 1972, to a personal appearance before an appeal board, the need to utilize circumstantial evidence to discern whether a fair hearing has taken place will be lessened.
There will still, of course, remain the question whether the registrant
received adequate consideration after he left the room. Under the 1971
Act, those registrants who are unable or do not choose to appear will
still be faced with the problem of boards overloaded with work. 113 Indeed, for these registrants the situation may deteriorate. If appeal boards
are instructed to consider both appearing and nonappearing registrants
at the same meeting, nonappearing registrants will probably be given
short shrift in the time left over from the appearances. Although state
and national directors have been directed by regulation to create new
appeal board panels to accommodate the increased time required by the
111 327 F. Supp. 1090, 4 SSLR 3443 (D. Minn. 1971).
112

Id. at 3444; accord, United States v. Page,

-

F. Supp. -, 5 SSLR 3308 (D. Minn.

1972).
113 Appeal board panels are established at the discretion of the Director of Selective
Service. New Reg. § 1604.22. Currently, there is an appeal board for each federal district
court. Needless to say, it would involve considerable time and expense if each registrant
were required to travel to the nearest courthouse city to obtain his personal appearance.
Some registrants would be forced to (or would prefer to) forego their right to a personal
appearance when faced with this obstacle. The Director has yet to take any action to
indicate how he will deal with this problem.
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personal appearances, 11 4 one may well wonder, in light of past tolerance
for overload, if the problem will be satisfactorily solved. In addition
to the possibility of being granted an even shorter appeal than formerly,
the nonappearing registrant may also confront greater problems in
making a showing of irregular procedure. The average time criterion
outlined above would seem to offer little help to these registrants since
the average time will have been extended by the personal appearances.
Indeed, the only adequate protection may be a requirement that boards
keep separate time records for nonfrivolous appeals. However, while
such a record is not without costs, it is not unduly burdensome in light
of the interests at stake.
2. The Appellate Resume. In an attempt to remedy the effects of the
severe time pressure imposed by the procedural overload, most appeal
boards have made it a standard procedure for a clerk to draw up a
resume of each registrant's file before the appeal board meeting. 115 This
saves considerable time by enabling the board to decide the case without
reference to the registrant's file. The clerk who compiles the resume
does not necessarily possess any expertise in Selective Service law, and
the product may therefore contain errors of law or omit significant
114 Old Reg. § 1604.22. New Reg. § 1604.22 places this power in the hands of the
national Director.
115 Nowhere do the regulations provide for any resume to be compiled, but they are
prepared in any event. This Review sent a questionnaire to all state directors and received
a reply from the General Counsel of Selective Service. His answers verified that the use of
resumes is standard practice. The letter confirmed the following: A resume is regularly
prepared for the appeal board's use; it is a general summary of the material in the file
and the basis for the requested deferment; it is prepared by an "experienced staff member"
and is used in all cases; all members of the board see it, but the file itself may or may not
ever be viewed; the resume is available up to one month prior to the meeting; it is never
shown to the registrant and is destroyed after the meeting. Letter from Walter H. Morse,
General Counsel, Selective Service System, to The University of Chicago Law Review, Nov.
'50, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Morse Letter]. Mr. Morse was careful to note that his answers
were obtained through a survey of state offices and do not reflect national Selective Service
policy. Practices undoubtedly vary considerably, especially with regard to the skill of the
preparer, the presence of the file, and the timing of the resume (some appeals are decided
within two weeks total time).
In the Wallen case, the state headquarters sent an official to testify at the trial. He
testified not that the full file was always read, but that the board members could have
access to it if they desired and requested it of the secretary. In the Woloszczuk case, the
board's secretary testified that the board saw the file only if the secretary had picked it
out as a case deserving special attention. An extended discussion of the problems created
by resumes is found in Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960). For mentions of the
existence of, or discussions of the use of, the appellate resume, see HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECroRS 24 (11th ed. A. Tatum 1970); Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 246;
Margolis, supra note 87, at 103; DRAFT COUNSELOR'S NEwsLETrER (published by Central
Committee for Conscientious Objectors), July, 1970; id., Aug., 1970; id., Issue 7, 1971,
Midwest section 2; 3 SSLR NEWSLETTER 57 (1971); 4 id. 26 (1971).
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facts. 116 The resume may condense a file of 150 pages to a four-sentence

summary and may be drawn under intense time pressures." 7 Sometimes resumes are not distributed to the appeal board members until

the time of the actual meeting. 118 Appeal boards not only favor the
resume over the file itself, but also often refuse to read legal briefs
submitted to them. 119 After the appeal board meeting, the resume is
121
routinely destroyed. 120 At no time is it shown to the registrant.

One such resume has appeared in a case, having apparently escaped
destruction:
WOLOSZCZUK, Stephen L. B. #38 (Worchester) #19-38-49-135
1-A to 4-D(Reg.) Age 18. DOB 9/19/49. Reg. filed Form 150

and appeals for 4-D class. He is a Jehovah's Witness. He is presently a VACATION (not REGULAR) PIONEER until Apr.30,
1968. (Elig. for 1-0 but not 4-D).122

The cases are split on the effect of such a resume. One line of cases
responding to the mandates of the procedural overload sanctions the
use of resumes if the use is fair. In one of these cases, United States v.
Young, 1 23 the court reasoned as follows:

If employed in a fair manner, this Court does not find efforts toward administrative efficiency repugnant to the demands of due

process. It would clearly be impossible to require every board
member to examine every document in every file. To do so would

result in needless and vast expenditures of time and energy.124
The opinion unfortunately fails to address the critical question of
what it means to employ a resume "in a fair manner." It is significant
that while Young and similar cases

25

refuse to condemn the use of the

116 See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1141.
117 Judge Henry Gwiazda, former Chairman of the National Appeal Board, testified to

this fact in Senate Hearings,supra note 9, at 249, 252.
118 See United States ex rel. Scott v. La France, - F. Supp. -, 4 SSLR 3493 (N.D. Ohio
1971); United States v. Wallen, 315 F. Supp. 439, 3 SSLR 3125 (D. Minn. 1970); Sedler,
supra note 11, at 1149; Morse Letter, supra note 115.
119 Cf. Senate Hearings,supra note 9, at 71.
120 Morse Letter, supra note 115.
121 Id. Even though Mr. Morse states that his answers do not indicate uniform policy,
an instance cannot be found in which such a resume has knowingly been shown to the
registrant.
122 United States v. Woloszczuk, 328 F. Supp. 696, 4 SSLR 3557, 8 (D. Mass. 1971).
123 324 F. Supp. 69, 3 SSLR 3381 (D. Minn. 1970).
124 Id. at 71, 3 SSLR at 3382. The new regulations, however, do require such an
inspection. See New Reg. §§ 1622.1, 1626.4(g)-(h).
125 E.g., Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1 SSLR 3233 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Tittlerud, - F. Supp. -, 2 SSLR 3283
(D. Minn. 1969).
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resume per se, neither do they allow the presence or use of a resume
to substitute for an examination of the contents of the file.
The opposing line of cases focuses on the determinative influence of
the clerk, concluding that the use of the resume is inherently unfair.
The Wallen court held:
It was in reality but an appeal to the clerk of the appeals board
only; for he or she is the one who makes the resume, who selects
the matters to be emphasized12and
who omits what he or she may
6
consider immaterial matters.

In most areas of administrative law, reports and recommendations by
subordinates are both allowed and encouraged. 127 There are, however,
crucial differences between normal administrative processes and Selective Service cases that militate in favor of a different result in draft
appeals. First, no briefs are submitted to the appeal board by the
parties, nor is there an open adversary process accompanied by the full
safeguards that normally attend administrative proceedings. If a resume
is compiled, it may be the only thing on which the board relies.12L
Second, since the appeal board members are volunteers, while the
clerk is a full-time staff member, board members are apt to defer to
the clerk's advice regardless of its validity. Third, since appeal boards
proceed in secret and issue opinions rarely or cryptically, there is
no way to ascertain the use actually made of the resume. Fourth, the
appeal board is charged with the duty to conduct a de novo review of
the case. If the resume is based solely on the proceedings below, and in
fact contains less information than the local board relied on, such a
de novo hearing cannot be afforded.1 29 As the court noted in United
States ex rel. Scott v. La France:L 0
The [regulatory] language clearly and concisely places the responsibility of review and decision of appeals before the Board of
Appeals upon a majority of a quorum of its members. This responsibility cannot be abdicated by the Board of Appeals by dele126 315 F. Supp. 459, 3 SSLR 3125, 6 (D. Minn. 1970); accord, United States v. Leichtfuss,
331 F. Supp. 723, 4 SSLR 3525, 3 (N.D. Ill. 1971); cf. House Hearings, supra note 5, at
12877. Other subdelegations and abdications of board authority are probably also barred.
United States v. Miller, No. 71-2040 (9th Cir., Feb. 11, 1972).
127 Reisner, supra note 12, suggests that even within the Selective Service System, a
properly regulated resume procedure can produce superior results. He found that the
Department of Justice hearing and resume procedure produced fewer legal errors on the
part of the appeal board than it commits under the current procedure.
128 See text and note at note 115 supra.
129 New Reg. §§ 1626.4, 1622, 1624 command the appeal board to classify in the same
manner as the local board and thus to look at all evidence in the file.
180 - F. Supp. -, 4 SSLR 3493 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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gating that responsibility and authority to its Executive Secretary.
...
The review and decision of petitioner's appeal was in fact a
review and decision of the Appeal Board's Executive Secretary,
and perfunctorily rubber-stamped by individual members thereof.'

31

Finally, there is reason to believe that Selective Service resumes are
drawn hastily and inexpertly in a way that cannot fail to prejudice the
registrant when the resumes are utilized hurriedly. The burdens on
appeal board time must necessarily compel reliance on the resume be32
yond any tolerable level.1
B.

The Right to Be Advised of the Evidence-Due Process and Another Side of the Resume Practice

If the resume contains an illegal standard for decision or factual errors
or omissions, 133 it is impossible for the reviewing court to rectify the
error unless the resume is disclosed. There is strong precedent for the
right to know the evidentiary basis on which decisions are made. Thus,
even if courts are unwilling to void the resume practice in the face of
current procedural overloads, alternative safeguards are available short
of complete invalidation.
An excellent parallel exists between the appellate resume and the
hearing procedure used prior to 1968 in conscientious objector cases. 134
Under that procedure, the FBI gathered background material on the
registrant. It then submitted this material to a Department of Justice
hearing examiner, who interviewed the registrant and made a recommendation to the Department regarding the disposition of the case. The
Department then recommended a disposition to the appeal board.3 5
For many years after this procedure was commenced, the registrant was
131 Id. at -, 4 SSLR at 3493-94.
132 See notes 115-22 supra. The Woloszczuk resume, note 122 supra, illustrates this
effect. The resume noted eligibility for 1-0 but not for 4-D classification, and that was
exactly the decision the appeal board made, even though the local board had also turned
down the 1-0 request and the registrant had made almost no effort to pursue that issue.
This resume and abbreviated hearing process is self-reinforcing. The shorter the appeal
time, the more reliance must be placed on the resume. The more the appeal board comes

to rely on the resume, the more tempting it is to shorten the consideration given to each
case.
133 The Woloszczuk resume contains such an error. The resume assumed that the name
the Jehovah's Witnesses attached to the type of post that the registrant held controlled his
eligibility. In fact, the relevant data are the number of hours per month he devoted to

the ministry and whether the ministry was his primary vocation. See SSLR PRAMrncE
MANuAL
1068 (1968).
134

See 1 K.C. DAvis, supra note 11,

17.14 (1958, 1970 Supp.); Reisner, supra note 12.

135 In most cases, the appeal board followed the Department's recommendation. See

Reisner, supra note 12, at 528; Sedler, supra note 11.
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not allowed to see any of the materials concerning his case.136 A series
of court decisions then established that the registrant was entitled to
see two products of the process: a fair resume of the material contained
in the FBI report and the Department of Justice's recommendation to
the appeal board. In Simmons v. United States,137 the Supreme Court
found that if a fair resume of the FBI report were not furnished, the
registrant would be unable to meet the evidence against him. Subsequently, the court held in Gonzales v. United States 3 that the registrant must be furnished a copy of the Department's recommendation.
The Court stated that the registrant would be denied a meaningful
appeal unless he was cognizant of all the information coming before
the appeal board and was enabled to counter and rebut adverse material.
In similar holdings designed to provide registrants with knowledge
of the facts crucial in the actual decision-making process, courts have
held that relevant information must be placed in the registrant's file' 3 9
and that the registrant must be advised of all such potentially harmful
or prejudicial information. 40 Yet such holdings have been circumvented by the physical separation of file and resume. The resume is
not placed in the file, but is destroyed. The clear thrust of these due
process requirements should not, however, be avoided by such formalisms. When the resume acts as a substitute for all the evidence and
provides the foundation for appeal board decisions, due process must
provide for full disclosure to the registrant.
C.

The Rights to an Opinion and a Transcript-Appeal Board Silence

Since the scope of review of an appeal board decision with respect to
the facts of the case is extremely narrow, and the appeal board decision
is unlikely to be upset on this basis, it is quite important to know exactly
what procedures the appeal board has followed in each individual case.
In a normal administrative or judicial proceeding, the due process rights
to an opinion and a transcript would supply the information. Un186 United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), marks the first substantial crack in this
policy. Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960); United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d
555, 1 SSLR 3228 (2d Cir. 1968); De Remer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965);
Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
.37 348 U.S. 397 (1955). The court then noted: "A fair resume is one which will permit
the registrant to defend against the adverse evidence-to explain it, to rebut it, or otherwise
detract from its damaging force." Id. at 405.
138 Id. at 407.
139 Reg. § 1621.12; see cases cited in Shattuck, Record Keeping Obligations of Local
Boards, 1 SSLR 4015 (1968). The registrant is allowed access to his file. Reg. § 1606.32(a)(1).
140 E.g., United States v. Cabbage, 430 F.2d 1037, 3 SSLR 3179 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 2 SSLR 3238 (8th Cir. 1969); Smith v. United States,
157 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 776 (1946).
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fortunately, Selective Service appeal boards only occasionally issue an
opinion and never supply a transcript.
1. Written Opinions. In the Selective Service context, an opinion is
normally referred to as a statement of reasons, or simply as reasons.
The reasons given by a board, if they are advanced at all, are abbreviated
and usually vague,1 4' although reasons that are purely conclusory are
not accepted by the courts. 142 The 1971 Act and the regulations issued
pursuant to it require appeal boards to give brief reasons for all decisions; 143 accordingly, the discussion that follows applies only to those
registrants whose cases will have been decided prior to March, 1972.
Appeal boards are now required by case law in most circuits to give
reasons for their decisions where the registrant has made a prima facie
claim of conscientious objector status and no obvious basis in fact for
denying the claim appears in the file. 4 4 The due process requirement
for reasons springs from the review standards established in Sicurella v.
United States. 4 5 There, the Supreme Court held that reliance by the
board on an illegal basis for the classification would require acquittal,
even though valid reasons also appeared. The presence of an illegal
ground for the decision made it impossible for the Court to determine
what weight had been placed on the legal ground. It is quite possible,
the Court said, that had the board known that one of its grounds was
incorrect, it would not have invoked the other ground at all.
141 See, for example, reasons recited by the court in United States ex rel. Stein v. Gillen,
332 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. IlL. 1971).
142 United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741, 3 SSLR 3265 (9th Cir. 1970); Batterton v.
United States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1958); Morin v. Grade, 301 F. Supp. 614, 3 SSLR
3067 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 1 SSLR 3224 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Hansen, supra note 58, at 478. But see United States v. Stickler, 452 F.2d 907, 5 SSLR
3046 (9th Cir. 1971).
143 New Reg. §§ 1623.4(c), 1624.6, 1625.4, 1626.3(a), 1626.4(i), 1627.4A(h) all require reasons
in a variety of situations.
144 Eight drcuits have such a requirement in one form or another. United States v.
O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 4 SSLR 3678 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d
49, 4 SSLR 3583 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472, 4 SSLR 3199 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lenhard,
437 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); Caverly v. United States, 429 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736
(9th Cir. 1968). The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits have no cases on the issue.
Some of these cases allow district courts to dig quite deeply into the file in order to find
defects in the claim obviating the requirement that the board state reasons. Cf. United
States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741, 3 SSLR 3265 (9th Cir. 1970). The Solicitor General recently
confessed error in a case where an admittedly prima fade claim was denied without reasons.
Joseph v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1274 (1972).
145 348 U.S. 385 (1955). See generally Comment, Administrative Findings in Selective
Service Litigation, 57 VA. L. Ry. 477 (1971).
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In 1971, Clay v. United States146 expanded the Sicurella doctrine to
include all cases in which the appeal board even arguably relied on an
invalid ground for decision, implicitly holding that the only way to
insure that such reliance did not occur was to require reasons for the
board's decisions.
Several courts have combined Sicurella and Clay to expand the reach
of the requirement that reasons be stated.147 There seems to be no

reason to confine the requirement to cases of conscientious objection
or prima facie claims. 148 In addition to enabling the courts to provide
meaningful review, the requirement of reasons is equally important if
the registrant himself is to make a meaningful appeal statement to
the National Appeal Board. Many courts have focused on the registrants'
right to know the facts and theories on which the board relied and to
which the statement of appeal must be addressed. 149
2. Transcripts. Draft counselors currently advise each registrant
to make as full a record of the personal appearance as he can and mail
it to his draft board.6 0 This dialogue from immediate recollection is
usually the best record obtainable of what actually transpired at the
appearance. Courts do not currently consider access to a transcript of the
registrant's rights. It has been held that the registrant has no right to
146 403 U.S. 698, 4 SSLR 3258 (1971).
147 E.g., United States v. Beckham, 330 F. Supp. 1099, 4 SSLR 8690, 3691 (W.D. Mich.
1971). The Sixth Circuit has also combined Sicurella and Clay to extend the requirement of
reasons: "A reviewing court faced with a silent file may only speculate as to what factors
motivated a given determination." United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 4 SSLR 3678
(6th Cir. 1971). But the Ninth Circuit declines to require reasons to deny a 2-A claim,
even if prima fade. United States v. Marcovich, 454 F.2d 138, 5 SSLR 3078 (9th Cir. 1972).
148 A few very recent cases have required the appeal board to state reasons even where
no prima fade claim has been made out. For example:
[Where a claim is made out, as here, for conscientious objector status, and the sole
record on review is a notion that the claim was considered and rejected, and there is
no explanation for the rejection, a very real problem arises as to whether the registrant
has been afforded due opportunity for administrative or judicial review of the local
board's action.
United States v. Neamond, 452 F.2d 25, 4 SSLR 3750 (3d Cir. 1971); cf. United States v.
Gyekis, 446 F.2d 1864, 4 SSLR 3398 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839,
3 SSLR 3833 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619, 3 SSLR 3185 (7th Cir.
1970); United States v. Auger, 837 F. Supp. 342, 5 SSL. 3193 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
United States v. Reese, 331 F. Supp. 1088, 4 SSLR 3658 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States
v. Nathan, - F. Supp. -, 3 SSLR 3190 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Reisner, supra note 12.
149 E.g., United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49, 4 SSLR 3583 (Ist Cir. 1971); United
States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839, 3 SSLR 3833 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Abbot, 425
F.2d 910, 2 SSLR 3651 (7th Cir. 1970); cf. Vitarelli v. United States, 359 U.S. 535 (1959);
Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
150 See HANBOOK FOR CONSCEmrsous OBJECrORs 22 (11th ed. A. Tatum 1970).
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bring a stenographer to the personal appearance."" In addition, a recent
national Selective Service directive specifically prohibited boards from
152
allowing the registrant to bring a tape recorder.
A transcript could be of great value in at least three types of situations.
First, where the board has failed to offer reasons for its decision, or
where the reasons are vague and conclusory, the transcript would allow
a court to infer bases for decision from the lines of questioning pursued.
In particular, if the questioning revealed that an illegal basis for decision was being utilized, the registrant could be afforded another hearing.153 Second, where there is some question as to the evidence the
registrant produced verbally to support his classification or, conversely
whether the registrant provided some basis in fact to deny his claim,
the transcript would provide a conclusive answer. Numerous cases turn
on just such an evidentiary problem. 54 Finally, a transcript would enable the registrant to show conclusively any prejudice that the board
might evince, either toward the registrant personally or toward some
entire class of claims (such as conscientious objection). 55
Transcripts are clearly an accepted element of the administrative process and are generally included within the elements of due process. 5
Under the conditions of Selective Service appeals, they appear to be
indispensable in enabling the court to exercise a meaningful review.
Moreover, there is no indication that the provision of a transcript would
in any way impede the functioning of the Selective Service System
since it need be nothing more than a recording of the personal appearance. Current Department of Defense regulations allow an in-service
conscientious objector claimant to make, at his own expense, a transcript of any of the proceedings involved in his processing.15 7 There
appears to be no reason why the transcript should not also be allowed
151 Uffelman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297, 303-4 (9th Cir. 1956). Under the new regulations permitting the registrant to bring witnesses with him to his personal appearance, it
might be possible, at the considerable risk of incurring hostile reactions from the local
board members, for the registrant to be accompanied by a stenographer. This stratagem
cannot work before the appeal board, however, since witnesses are not admitted. Cf. SSLR
PRAcrca MANUAL
1080.
152 Letter to All State Directors 00-43, SSLR 2200:89 (Oct. 26, 1971).
153

See Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).

154 E.g., United States v. Iverson, 455 F.2d 79, 5 SSLR 3120 (8th Cir. 1972).
155 Such prejudice would be a clear basis for invalidating an induction order. See, e.g.,
Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967); SSLR PRACriCE MANUAL
1072, 1075.
156 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
157 Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, SSLR 2325 (Aug. 20, 1971).
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or required before an appeal board in light of its potential usefulness
to both the registrant and the Government.
-

III. A DUE PROCESS MODEL FOR APPEAL BOARD PROCEDURE

Based on the preceding discussion, it seems reasonable to estimate
that of the serious appeals taken by registrants, at least ninety percent
are not conducted in accord with the demands of due process. 58 The
personal appearances and statements of reasons required by the 1971
Act and regulations will reduce this percentage for persons processed
after March, 1972, but it will still be a substantial figure. A realistic
program to remedy the problem is not, however, difficult to devise. The
following model procedure could provide maximum safeguards for the
registrant without interfering with any need for expeditious processing,
if such a need is thought to be important.
In accordance with current regulations, 159 more appeal board panels
would be created to alleviate the administrative overload. These would
be scattered throughout the state, so that the registrant could exercise
his right to a personal appearance without the need for extensive travel.
The additional panels would also enable speedier consideration of cases
and thus create some additional time for the procedures outlined below.
When an appeal was taken, an experienced staff member would draw
up a resume of the file, extract any documents crucial to the case, and
send the resume to appeal board members and the registrant. The
registrant would then have ten days in which to draw attention to any
inadequacy in the resume and to submit any response he might wish
to make to its contentions and recommendations. He could point out
any part of his file that he thought was crucial, but which was overlooked or omitted. The appeal board would then decide the case on
the basis of the resume and the registrant's answer, consulting any parts
of the file to which the registrant had drawn attention. If the registrant chose to exercise his right to appear, he could be accompanied by
witnesses and counsel. Imposition of a reasonable time limit on the
proceeding would prevent significant delay. The same papers would be
used whether or not the registrant appeared. The appeal board meeting
would be recorded to provide a transcript, and the board would automatically furnish a short statement of the reasons for the decision and
the facts that were relied upon. Special time would be set aside at the
meeting for consideration of "difficult" cases. The members of the
158 On the length of time and appellate resume issues alone, almost all Selective Service
classifications would falter.
159 New Reg. § 1604.22.
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appeal board would be required to have read all crucial documents before coming to the meeting.
In order to save further time for the procedure outlined above,
the appeal board or its staff member would be allowed to designate any
appeal as "frivolous" and thereby omit all the above steps. The resume
would be drawn by the staff member and submitted directly to the
board. To safeguard fully the rights of the registrant, however, should
his case later come before a court, that court would hold a de novo
classification proceeding. 160 Such a procedure would act as protection
in the event that a fully substantiated claim were dismissed as frivolous.
The procedure outlined above is not radical, but is necessary. It
would provide basic procedural rights in the Selective Service System,
and thereby assure the protection of the interests of the registrant,
where little such protection now exists.
Frank H. Easterbrook
160 This should be no burden on the Government since by hypothesis it would occur
only when the claim were untenable. Indeed, most registrants would accept induction rather
than risk an almost certain criminal conviction. The object of the de novo hearing would be
simply to ensure that at some point in the proceedings, the registrant received a full and
fair hearing of his claim, however frivolous it might seem to the appeal board.

